Tentative Ruling: Tavares v. Walmart, Inc., et al.
Case Number
CIVSB2331240
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Thu, 01/23/2025 - 12:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion to Compel
Tentative Ruling
CIVSB2331240: Tavares v. Walmart, Inc., et al.
Motions: Motion to Compel Further re (1) Form Interrogatories-Employment; (2) Special Interrogatories; and (3) Request for Production of Documents
Movants: Plaintiff Cindy Tavares
Respondents: Defendant Walmart, Inc.
__________________________________________________________________________________
DISCUSSION Plaintiff Tavares moves to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories-Employment #209.2, Special Interrogatories #83-93, and RFP #20. Walmart objected to these requests on the grounds of invading third-party’s privacy interest and relevance. Defendant Walmart now opposes the motions to compel further. Plaintiff Tavares replies. At the outset, the motion as to Special Interrogatory #90 is denied as Plaintiff agreed to withdraw this interrogatory in her September 13, 2024 meet and confer correspondence. In seeking further responses, Plaintiff argues the information is proper “me too” evidence. To demonstrate motive or intent, a plaintiff may use “me too” evidence as a means to cast doubt on an employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment action. (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109-110, 114-15; Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 760.) Yet, it is never permissible to prove the propensity to harass. (Pinter-Brown v. Regents of University of California (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55, 89.) If “me too” evidence may be admissible 1 at trial, then it would be discoverable and relevant. However, the relevancy is fact-based and depends on many factors such as “how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.” (Meeks v. AutoZone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 871.) Here, arguably, the information requested is relevant as evidence about sexual harassment within the Hesperia Walmart location by other supervisors could lead to evidence demonstrating the lack of response by Walmart contrary to any anti-harassment policies, and may support the failure to prevent cause of action. With regard to privacy interests, individuals under the California Constitution have a right to privacy that protects their information, including personnel/employment records. (Williams v. Superior Court (Marshalls of CA, LLC) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [“Williams”]; Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1271; BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (Dunsmuir Joint Union High School Dist.) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 756.) Of course, the constitutional right to privacy is not absolute. (Palay v. Superior Court (County of Los Angeles) (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 919, 933.) Although the contact information of a witness or person with a monetary or equitable interest in the litigation is not a serious invasion [Code Civ. Proc., §2017.010; Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 552-55; Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (Olmstead) (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370-75], the identities sought here are not of witnesses or putative class members. The disclosure is of those who made sexual harassment complaints and the complainants could expect that their complaints would be held confidential. Similarly, the alleged harasser could anticipate an internal complaint naming him/her as engaging in harassment and thus this information would not be subject to general disclosure. Furthermore, their identities are not necessary to provide motive or intent. Nonetheless, those who filed civil litigations and those named within civil litigations would not expect privacy on their names, which are part of the public record. Yet even then, the contact information of those persons has no bearing on the potential relevancy of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion to compel further as specified in the ruling section. Sanctions: Plaintiff prevailed on most of the at-issue Special Interrogatories and Defendant’s compromise to limit discovery to complaints against Astorga only is unfounded. Thus, sanctions are justified here. Compensation for time to meet and confer, however, is not justified as it is mandated before filing the motion. Additionally, no explanation is given as to why two attorneys were needed to work on these straightforward motions. Moreover, the motions and replies are very similar to each other and thus did not require much additional work to produce all three motions. Lastly, Plaintiff does not break down the cost. The Court therefore finds that a reasonable sanction is $2,490 total (6 hours at $400 per hour, plus $30 per each motion). RULING Based on the foregoing, the Court’s ruling is as follows: Plaintiff Tavares’ Motion to Compel Further re Form Interrogatory #209.2 is granted, but limited as agreed by Plaintiff (Plaintiff’s worksite and five years before the complaint’s filing) and excluding the address and telephone number of the employee. 2 Plaintiff Tavares’ Motion to Compel Further re Special Interrogatories ## 83, 87-88, and 91-93 is granted. Plaintiff Tavares’ Motion to Compel Further re Special Interrogatories ## 84-86 and 89-90 is denied. Plaintiff Tavares’ Motion to Compel Further re RFP #20 is granted, but limited as agreed by Plaintiff (Plaintiff’s worksite and five years before the complaint’s filing) with redaction of the names and contact information of the alleged victim, harasser, and/or witnesses. Defendant Walmart is ordered to serve verified, further responses to Form Interrogatory #209.2, Special Interrogatories #83, 87-88, & 91-93, and RFP #20 within 30 days of this ruling. Defendant Walmart is ordered to pay $2,490 in sanctions to Plaintiff within 30 days of this ruling. Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s findings, rulings and orders as set forth herein.